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CHAOS IN THE COURTROOM: 
CONTROLLING DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANTS AND 
CONTUMACIOUS COUNSEL IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
Michael P. Scharf 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Saddam Hussein Trial will no doubt be remembered as one of 
the messiest trials in legal history. During the eight-month long "Dujail" 
trial (October 2005-August 2006), Saddam Hussein, his seven co-
defendants, and their dozen lawyers regularly disparaged the judges, inter-
rupted witness testimony with outbursts, turned cross-examination into po-
litical diatribes, and staged frequent walk-outs and boycotts. 1 The first Pre-
siding Judge, Rizgar Amin, was pressured to resign due to the perception 
that he had lost the battle of the wills against Saddam Hussein, and the re-
placement judge, Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman, often shouted angrily at the defen-
dants and repeatedly tossed them and their lawyers out of the courtroom. 
The trial was the first ever to be televised gavel-to-gavel in any Middle 
Eastern country, enabling the world to witness the daily scenes of chaos in 
the courtroom. 
I was one of the members of the team of experts assembled by the 
Regime Crimes Liaison Office and the International Bar Association to train 
the Iraqi High Tribunal judges. During the training sessions in the fall of 
2004 and spring of 2005, we spent a great deal of time discussing a number 
of ways to respond to the defendants' and defense counsel's likely disrup-
tive antics. Needless to say, things did not go as we had hoped. 
A month after the conclusion of the Dujail trial, in September 2006, 
I was invited by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, to speak to his staff in The Hague about the lessons from 
the Dujail Trial concerning maintaining order in the courtroom during a war 
crimes trial. Drawn from my Hague lecture, this article examines some of 
history's previous messy trials and the strategies judges have employed with 
Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Co-author of the book, SADDAM ON TRlAL 
(2006) and founder of the Grotian Moment: Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, 
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial, Scharf was a member of the international team of experts 
that provided training to the judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal in 2004 and 2005. The author 
thanks Christine Lillie for her invaluable research assistance. 
1 Christopher Allbritton, Saddam 's Trial: Behind the Scene, TIME, Feb. 13, 2006, at 50-
51. 
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varying degrees of success to respond to disruptive conduct by trial partici-
pants. It then describes the various tactics employed by the judges in the 
Dujail trial and analyzes why they were not more successful. The article 
concludes with a detailed prescription for maintaining order in future war 
crimes trials. 
II. THE NEED FOR ORDERLY JUSTICE IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
Disruptive conduct may be defined as any intentional conduct by 
the defendant or defense counsel in the courtroom "that substantially inter-
feres with the dignity, order and decorum of judicial proceedings."2 There 
are six main types of disorder: 
(1) passive disrespect, for example, the refusal to address the judge as 
"Your Honor" or refusal to stand when the judge enters the courtroom; 
(2) refusal to cooperate with the essential ground rules of the judicial pro-
ceedings 
(e.g., constantly insisting on making political speeches instead of asking 
questions 
during cross-examination); 
(3) a single obscenity or shout; 
(4) repeated trial interruptions, ranging from insulting remarks to loud 
shouting or cursing; 
(5) in a televised trial, attempting to incite acts of mass violence; and 
(6) resorting to physical violence in the courtroom.3 
Former leaders and their counsel in war crimes trials are especially 
likely to engage in such forms of disruption. Because of the political context 
and widespread publicity, leaders on trial are more likely than ordinary de-
fendants to have concluded that they do not stand a chance of obtaining an 
acquittal by playing by the judicial rules. Instead, they seek to derail the 
proceedings, hoping for a negotiated solution (e.g., amnesty) outside the 
courtroom; to hijack the televised proceedings, hoping to transform them-
selves through political speeches into martyrs in the eyes of their followers; 
and to discredit the tribunal by provoking the judges into inappropriately 
harsh responses which will make the process appear unfair. 
As Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, ob-
served sixty years ago, war crimes trials, whether before international tribu-
nals or domestic courts, seek to establish a credible historic record of abuses 
and elevate the rule of law over the force of might, thereby facilitating the 
2 NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE 
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT 91 ( 1973 ). 
3 !d. at 91. 
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restoration of peace and the transition to democracy.4 While tolerating dis-
sent is a healthy manifestation of a democratic government, "a courtroom is 
not an arena in which dissension, particularly of a disruptive nature, may 
supplant, or even take precedence over, the task of administering justice."5 
This is especially true in a war crimes trial. 
Unlike other forms of acceptable political expression, a disruptive 
defendant or defense lawyer who interferes with the "grandeur of court pro-
cedure" (as Hannah Arendt once described the judicial process)6 threatens 
the proper administration of criminal justice in several fundamental ways. 
First, disruptive conduct renders it more difficult for the defendant and any 
co-defendants to obtain a fair trial. Second, it hampers the court's ability to 
facilitate the testimony of victims and other witnesses. Third, it undermines 
the public's confidence in and respect for the legal process. 
There are those who would argue that a defendant has a right, 
through his own (or through his lawyer's) disruptive and obstructionist con-
duct, to an unfair trial, but modem war crimes tribunals have held that the 
defendant's right to employ disruptive tactics which seek to discredit the 
judicial process must give way to the tribunal's obligation to protect "the 
integrity of the proceedings" and "to ensure that the administration of jus-
tice is not brought into disrepute."7 The duty of a war crimes tribunal to 
ensure that a trial is fair has been interpreted as inCluding concerns that go 
beyond just those of the accused. 
ll. HISTORY'S MOST TUMULTUOUS TRlALS 
A. From the Chicago Seven to Zacarias Moussaoui 
The administration of justice has always endured a degree of disor-
der and there have been many notable occasions when trial participants have 
been particularly unruly and disrespectful to judicial authority. A list of 
history's most disruptive defendants would include Sir Walter Raleigh (tried 
in Britain for high treason in 1603), William Penn (tried in Britain for 
4 Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President, June 7, 1945, quoted in MlCHAEL P. 
SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 37 (1997) ("We must establish incredible events by credible evi-
dence."); see also Robert H. Jackson, Opening Speech for the Prosecution at Nuremberg, 
Nov. 21, 1945 quoted in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MrLITARYTRmUNALNUREMBERG, Vol. II 98-99 (1946). 
5 
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Aams, J.,eoncurring and 
dissenting). 
6 
Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in Is LAW DEAD? 212 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 
1971). 
7 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga 
Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court, 
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, ~ 28 (Jan. 17, 2005). 
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unlawful assembly in 1670), Auguste Vaillant (tried in France for blowing 
up the Chamber of Deputies in 1894), Michele Angiolillo (tried in Spain for 
assassinating the Spanish premier in 1897), and Gaetano Bresci (tried in 
Italy for killing Italian King Humbert in 1899).8 But by far the most notori-
ous disorderly trial in modem history was the Chicago Seven conspiracy 
trial of 1969-1970. 
The Chicago Seven trial is particularly relevant to the Saddam Hus-
sein trial because Hussein's chief American Lawyer, former U.S. Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, had also been an advisor to the defense team in that 
notorious trial three decades earlier. In the Chicago Seven case, the leaders 
of the anti-Vietnam war movement-Bobby Seale, David Dellinger, Abbie 
Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Lee Weiner, and John 
Froines-were charged with conspiring, organizing, and inciting riots dur-
ing the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.9 The trial drew 
considerable public notice because of the defendants' notoriety and their 
courtroom antics. 
On the first day of the trial, when the presiding judge, Julius Hoff-
man, refused to issue a postponement so that Bobby Seale's attorney would 
have time to recover from a gall bladder operation, 10 Seale said to the judge, 
"If I am consistently denied this right of legal defense counsel of my choice 
who is effective by the judge of this Court, then I can only see the judge as a 
blatant racist of the United States Court."11 This brought a strong rebuke 
from Judge Hoffman. 12 That same day, Judge Hoffman reprimanded Tom 
Hayden for giving a clenched fist salute to the jury and Abbie Hoffman for 
blowing kisses at the jurors. 13 A few days later, the defendants tried to drape 
the counsel table with a North Vietnamese flag in celebration of Vietnam 
Moratorium Day, drawing another round of sharp words from the judge. 14 
Throughout the trial, the defendants refused to rise at the beginning 
or close of court sessions. 15 On two occasions, defendants Abbie Hoffman 
and Jerry Rubin wore judicial robes in court onto which were pinned a Jew-
ish yellow star, meant to imply that Judge Hoffman was running his court-
room like the courts of Nazi Germany. 16 The defendants frequently called 
8 Dorsen, supra note 2, at 24-32. 
9 Although there were initially eight defendants, Bobby Seale was severed from the case 
before it went to the jury. 
10 See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 358 (7th Cir. 1972). 
11 Id. at 374. 
12 Id. 
13 See Pnina Lahav, Th~ater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 16 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 381, 387 (2004). 
14 See id. 
15 461 F.2d at 382, 386. 
16 Lahav, supra note 13, at 430. 
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Judge Hoffman derogatory names, accused him of racism and prejudice, 
and made sarcastic comments to him, such as asking "How is your war 
stock doing?" The most serious disorder occurred two weeks into the trial, 
when Judge Hoffman learned that a few minutes before the commencement 
of the court session, Bobby Seale had addressed the audience of his sup-
porters in the courtroom, telling them that if he were attacked "they know 
what to do."17 Judge Hoffman responded by having Seale bound and 
gagged. Defense counsel William Kunstler then scolded the Court, saying 
"This is no longer a court of order, your Honor; this is a medieval torture 
chamber. It is a disgrace."18 
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Hoffman issued a total of 159 
citations to the defendants and their lawyers for contempt in response to 
these incidents of disruption and disrespect. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, however, reversed the contempt convictions on the ground that the 
judge cannot wait until the end of the trial to punish the defendants and their 
lawyers for misconduct. It also reversed the convictions on the substantive 
charges, in part due to the prejudicial remarks and actions of the trial judge 
and inflammatory statements by the prosecutor during the trial.19 It should 
come as no surprise that the Chicago Seven trial is universally seen as a low 
point in American courtroom management. Rather than viewing Judge 
Hoffman as a brave hero fighting anarchy, history remembers him more as 
an accomplice who unwittingly fanned the flames of disorder. Slobodan 
Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, both of whom were advised by Ramsey 
Clark, set out to do the same thing to the judges ofthe International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Iraqi High Tribunal. 
Just a few months after the Chicago Seven trial, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Illinois v. Allen that an unruly defendant could be excluded 
from the courtroom during his trial if his disruptive behavior threatened to 
make orderly and proper proceedings difficult or wholly impossible?0 Allen 
had been tried in a state court in 1957 for armed robbery of a tavern owner. 
During his trial, Allan threatened the judge's life, made abusive remarks to 
the court and announced that under no circumstances would he allow his 
trial to proceed. The court responded by removing him from the courtroom, 
after appropriate warning, and Allen was convicted in his absence. 
The Supreme Court affirmed Allen's conviction, ruling that re-
moval after a warning was permissible and far less objectionable than use of 
17 !d. 
18 !d. 
19 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dillinger, 472 
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). 
20 Ill" . mo1s v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Court explained that it was "essential to the 
proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmark of 
all court proceedings in our country." Jd. at 343. 
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restraints. In a passage that was obviously inspired by the publicity sur-
rounding the Chicago Seven t1ial, the Supreme Court stated: 
Trying a defendant for a crime while he sits bound and gagged before the 
judges and jury would to an extent comply with that part of the Sixth 
Amendment's purposes that accords the defendant an opportunity to con-
front the witnesses at the trial. But even to contemplate such a technique, 
much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while 
shackled and gagged except as a last resort. Not only is it possible that the 
sight of shackles and gags lnight have a significant effect on the jury's 
feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself some-
thing of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings 
that the judge is seeking to uphold?1 
Yet the Court declined to rule that physical restraints may never be used, 
saying: "However, in some situations which we need not attempt to foresee, 
binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way 
to handle a defendant who acted as Allen did here. "22 
The first major chaotic trial to arise after the Supreme Court's Allen 
decision was that of Charles Manson who, along with three women mem-
bers of his cult, was tried from June 1970 to March 1971 for the gruesome 
murder of movie actress Sharon Tate and five others. During the trial, Man-
son constantly interrupted proceedings by shouting, chanting, turning his 
back on the judge, assuming a crucifixion pose, and singing (actions often 
parroted by the three women co-defendants).23 The court responded by re-
peatedly having the defendants removed from the courtroom. In one in-
stance, the judge removed Manson after he leaped over the defense table to 
attack the judge with a pencil, shouting "In the name of Christian justice, 
someone should cut your head off. "24 
More recently, in February 2006, accused al-Qaeda terrorist 
Zacarias Moussaoui, was thrown out of the courtroom by U.S. District 
Judge Leonie Brinkema, and then temporarily banned from returning to 
court, due to his disruptive and belligerent outbursts. "This trial is a circus . 
. . God curse you and America," Moussaoui shouted a! the judge as he was 
led away. "You are the biggest enemy of yourself," Judge Brinkema replied, 
ordering that Moussaoui watch the remainder of the proceedings via closed-
21 !d. at 344. 
22 Id. 
23 Robert Dardenne, The Case of Charles Manson, in THE PRESS ON TRIAL 159, 167 (Lloyd 
Chiasson Jr. ed. 1991). 
24 Id. 
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circuit feed from a jail cell inside the courthouse. Media outlets reported 
that most legal scholars agreed that Judge Brinkema acted appropriately.25 
B. Disorder in The Hague 
Slobodan Milosevic was the first forn1er head of state to be tried in 
an international war crimes trial. Although assisted by an army of defense 
counsel including Ramsey Clerk, Milosevic asserted his right to act as his 
own lawyer in the televised proceedings before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, as 
this would enable him to make lengthy opening and closing statements and 
turn cross-examinations into oppmiunities for unfettered political diatribes. 
As the trial unfolded, Milosevic exploited his right of self-representation to 
treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and the judges in a manner that would earn 
ordinary defense counsel expulsion from the comiroom. He often strayed 
from the forensic case into long vitriolic speeches and he was frequently 
strategically disruptive.26 
On numerous occasions, the presiding judge, Richard May, tried to 
reign in Milosevic with little success. A defendant who is represented by a 
lawyer is ordinarily able to address the court only when he takes the stand to 
give testimony during the defense's case-in-chief. And in the usual case, the 
defendant is limited to giving evidence that is relevant to the charges, and 
he is subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. While a judge can 
control an unruly lawyer by threatening fines, jail time, suspension, or dis-
barment, there is little a judge can do to effectively regulate a disruptive 
defendant who is acting as his own counsel. 
While Milosevic's antics did not win him points with the judges, 
they had a significant impact on public opinion back home in Serbia. Rather 
than discredit his nationalistic policies, the tJ.ial had the opposite effect. His 
approval rating in Serbia doubled during the first weeks of the trial, and two 
years into the tJ.ial he easily won a seat in the Serb parliament in a nation-
25 MicHAEL P. SCHARF, Did the Dujail Trial Meet International Standards of Due Process, 
in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI H:IGH TRIBUNAL 162, 163 
(Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, eds. 2006); see generally Neil A. Lewis, Judge 
Ejects 9/11 Suspect After Outburst, N.Y. TllviES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A20; Kelli Arena & Kevin 
Bohn, Al Qaeda Conspirator Barred from Court, CNN.com, Feb. 14, 2006, 
1ttp://www.cnn.com/200G/LA W/02/14/moussaoui.trial/index.html/. 
26 For references by the Tribunal ofMilosevic misusing hearings and cross examinations 
.sa platform for making political speeches, see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-
', Initial Appearance (July 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Status 
:onference, (Oct. 30, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session, 
\fov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Hearing, (Nov. 10, 2004); 
rosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T Pre-Defense Conference, (June 17, 2004); see 
'so Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct 
"Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 823, 832 
005). 
., 
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wide election. In addition, opinion polls indicated that a majority of Serbs 
felt that he was not getting a fair trial, and that he was not actually guilty of 
any war crimes.27 Suspicion surrmmding the circumstances of Milosevic's 
death just before the conclusion of his trial has only reinforced these widely 
held views. 
Six months after Milosevic's death, another Serb leader, Vojislav 
Seselj, decided that he, too, would utilize the right of self-representation as a 
means of dismpting his trial before the ICTY. Seselj made his unruly inten-
tions clear on the eve of trial when he published three books in Serbia enti-
tled Genocidal Israeli Diplomat Them·dor Meron (about the President of the 
ICTY), In the Jaws of the Whore Del Ponte (about the Chief Prosecutor of 
the Tribunal), and The Lying Hague Homosexual, Geoffrey Nice (about the 
lead trial prosecutor).28 Seselj tried repeatedly to provoke the judges at pre-
trial hearings and made numerous obscene and improper statements in his 
pre-trial motions, including one submission which stated, "You, all you 
members of The Hague Tribunal Registry, can only accept to suck my 
cock."29 
On the eve of trial in August 2006, the Trial Chamber revoked Se-
selj 's right to self-representation. 
While it is clear that the conduct of the Accused brings into question his 
willingness to follow the "ground rules" of the proceedings and to respect 
the decorum of the Court, more fundamentally, in the Chamber's view, 
this behaviour compromises the dignity of the tribunal and jeopardizes the 
very foundations upon which its proper functioning is based. 30 
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the Trial Chamber could revoke the right 
to self-representation where the Trial Chamber found "that appropriate cir-
cumstances, rising to the level of substantial and persistent obstruction to 
the proper and expeditious conduct of the trial exist."31 The Appeals Cham-
ber, however, held that the Trial Chamber had to first give the defendant an 
explicit warning. The Trial Chamber subsequently did so, and in light of 
Seselj 's continuing dismptive behavior, appointed counsel over his objec-
tion to represent him for the trial. 
27 Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International 
Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3, 6 
(2005). 
28 Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, ~ 30 
(Aug. 21, 2006). 
29 ld. ~ 48. 
30 I d. ~ 77. 
31 Prosecutor v. Seslj, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber's Decision on As-
signment of Counsel, IT-03-67-AR73.3, Oct. 20, 2006, at para. 21. 
~.11 
d 
d 
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C. Disarray in the Dujail Trial 
On August 11, 2005, the democratically elected Iraqi National As-
sembly adopted the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal with some modifica-
tions. Notably, the Assembly replaced the clause providing for a right of 
self-representation with a clause that said that all defendants before the Tri-
bunal had to be represented by Iraqi Cqunsel, who could be assisted by for-
eign lawyers. 32 During the training sessions, I strongly advocated for such 
an amendment in order to ensure that Saddarn Hussein would not be able to 
use self-representation as a means of hijacking and disrupting the IHT. 
What I did not comprehend at the time, however, was that this legislative 
change would not accomplish the goal if the judges decided to follow the 
unique Iraqi legal tradition of permitting a defendant to cross-examine each 
witness after his lawyer had done so.33 
During the Dujail trial, Saddam Hussein and the other defendants 
were constantly disruptive and prone to political theater. Hussein's disrup-
tive conduct often coincided with the most emotionally compelling testi-
mony of victims. He engaged in frequent angry outbursts. He yelled at the 
judge to "go to hell" and called the judge a homosexual, a dog, and a whore-
monger. He made wild accusations of mistreatment by his American jailers. 
He insisted on prayer breaks in the middle of witness testimony, went on 
hunger strikes, and repeatedly refused to attend trial sessions. Most trou-
bling, he took advantage of the Iraqi legal tradition that permits the defen-
dant to cross-examine each witness after his lawyer has finished his cross-
examination by making frequent political speeches and impelling his fol-
lowers-who were watching the television broadcasts of the proceedings-
to kill American occupiers and Iraqi government collaborators. 
Meanwhile, Hussein's co-defendant, Barzan al-Tikriti, who served 
as head of the Internal Security Agency, competed with Hussein for the 
most offensive insults directed at the bench. On one occasion, he appeared 
32 Qanoon Al-Mahkamat Al-Jeena'eyyat Al-Eraqiyyat Al-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi 
High Tribunal] art. 19(d), Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ 
documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf (Iraq), reproduced in MICHAEL P. ScHARF & 
GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM ON 'TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH 
T~BUNAL 283 (2006); English Translation of the Iraqi High Tribunal Rules of Procedure and 
EVJdence (2005), Rule 29, id. at 313. 
33 . 
. ~ere Js also some international tribunal precedent for the approach of the IHT. After 
assJgrung counsel over the accused's objection, the ICTY permitted the accused Krajisnic "as 
an ex~ception to the usual regime, to supplement counsel's cross-examination with his own 
~uestwns." Prosecutor v. Krajisnic, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajisnik's 
3_equest to Proceed Unrepresented by Counsel, Case No. IT-00-39-T, 18 August 2005, para. 
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in court wearing only his pajamas,34 and another time, he insisted on sitting 
on the courtroom floor with his back to the judge. 35 
For their part, Saddam Hussein's retained lawyers, in particular 
Lebanese defense attorney Bushra al-Khalil and Jordanian lawyer Salah al-
Annouti, frequently made outrageous political speeches and acted in out-
right contempt of the Iraqi High Tribunal. They engaged in tactics such as 
insulting Judge Ra'ouf, holding up photos of U.S. prison abuses at Abu 
Ghraib,36 and on one occasion pulling off their defense counsel robes and 
hurling them at the bench.37 Saddam Hussein's retained lawyers also staged 
a walk-out in the middle of a trial session and boycotted the majority of the 
trial sessions including the closing arguments.38 These acts violated Iraqi 
law and the Iraqi Code of Legal Professional Ethics, which provide that 
lawyers practicing in Iraqi courts must be respectful toward the court, must 
appear in court on the set dates, should not try to delay the resolution of a 
case, and must facilitate the task of the judge. 39 
The flrst presiding judge, Rizgar Arnin, attempted to deal with such 
disruptive behavior by ignoring it.40 Although human rights groups ap-
plauded Judge Rizgar's calm demeanor in conducting the the trial, the Iraqi 
population felt that he was losing the "battle of the wills" against the former 
dictator, and he resigned under the weight of mass public criticism.41 The 
new presiding judge, Ra'ouf Abdul Rahman, employed a number of tactics 
to regain control ofhis courtroom.42 
34 Edward Wong, The Reach of War: The Trial; Hussein, Gleeful, Badgers the Judge and 
Declares a Hunger Strike Over His Treatment, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2006, at A10. 
35 Robert F. Worth, Prosecutors of Hussein Press Charges of Execution, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 
14, 2006, at A8. 
36 Edward Wong, Saddam Admits He Swiftly Doomed 148 Villagers, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
April2006. 
37 Hussan M. Fatah, For a Shiite, Defending Hussein is a Labor of Love, N.Y. TIMES, June 
24, 2006, at A4. 
38 See Nehal Bhuta, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 
71 (Human Rights Watch, 2006) (discussing the role of Defense Office lawyers after pri-
vately-retained defense counsel began boycotting the Dujail trial in February of2006). 
39 Law of the Legal Profession, No. 173 of 1965, art. 50; Lawyer's Professional Code of 
Conduct, June 16, 1987 (annexed to the Law of the Legal Profession), art. 9, cited in Bhuta, 
supra note 38, at 70. 
40 See Michael Scharf, Who Won the Battle of Wills in the December Proceedings of the 
Saddam Trial?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH 
TRIBUNAL 129, 130 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, 2006). 
41 See Michael Scharf, A Changing of the Guard at the Iraqi High Tribunal, in SADDAM 
ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 136, 136-37 (Michael 
P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, 2006). 
42 See Michael Scharf, The Battle of the Wills-Part Two, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: 
UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 143, 143-44 (Michael P. Scharf 
& Gregory S. McNeal, 2006). 
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Judge Ra'oufbegan his first day as presiding judge by sternly warn-
ing defendants and counsel that outbursts and insults would not be tolerated. 
A few minutes later, he demonstrated his resolve by evicting defendant Bar-
zan al-Tikriti and defense counsel Bushra al-Khalil when they failed to heed 
to his admonishment. When the retained defense counsel responded by boy-
cotting the trial en masse, Judge Ra'ouf appointed public defenders tore-
place them. Notably, when the retained defense counsel later asked to re-
turn, Judge Ra'oufpermitted them to do so. He never imposed fines or other 
sanctions on them for their misbehavior, despite the fact that they resorted 
to such tactics again and again throughout the trial. Nor did he revoke the 
defendants' right to question the witnesses or to address the court, despite 
the fact that it was frequently abused. 
Ill. REMEDIES FOR DISRUPTION 
A. Limiting Self-Representation 
Permitting a former leader to assert the right of self-representation 
in a war crimes trial is a virtual license for abuse. There is no customary 
international law right to self-representation, and many countries of the 
world require that defendants be represented by counsel in all cases involv-
ing serious charges.43 The Iraqi National Assembly was prudent to require 
that defendants before the Iraqi High Tribunal be represented by Iraqi lead 
counsel, who the Tribunal could control through various sanctions available 
under Iraqi law. 
It was a huge mistake, however, for the presiding judges of the Iraqi 
High Tribunal to allow the defendants to question witnesses following their 
lawyers' cross-examinations, as this completely undermined the objective of 
the National Assembly's revisions to the lliT Statute. Instead, the judges 
should have recognized that departures from traditional Iraqi practices are 
warranted in an extraordinary trial of this nature, especially as the tradi-
tional practice was neither required by Iraqi nor international law. 
In the United States, courts have held that a defendant who is repre-
sented by a lawyer has no right to act as co-counsel by, for example, cross-
examining witnesses or addressing the bench. The rule limiting the defen-
dant's participation is necessary "to maintain order, prevent unnecessary 
consumption of time or other undue delay, to maintain the dignity and deco-
rum of the court and to accomplish a variety of other ends essential to the 
due administration of justice. "44 
Even in a tribunal such as the ICTY, whose statute provides for the 
right of self-representation, the Appeals Chamber decision in the Seselj case 
43 
Scharf & Rassi, supra note 27, at 13-15 (2005). 
44 
United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
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recognizes that such a right is a qualified one. Abuse it and you lose it.45 
Drawing from international tribunal precedent, defense counsel should be 
imposed on a defendant who seeks to represent himself where: (1) the de~ 
fendant attempts to boycott his trial;46 (2) the defendant's self-representation 
would prejudice the fair trial rights of co~defendants;47 (3) the defendant is 
being persistently disruptive or obstructionist;48 or (4) self~representation 
would unreasonably prolong the trial.49 
Since most war crimes tribunal courtrooms are partitioned by 
sound-proof glass, a judge may effectively deal with minor disruptions by 
simply turning off the defendant's microphone. In the case of persistent 
disruptions, the judge must give a specific warning before revoking the right 
of self-representation. In addition, the defendant must be accorded at least a 
chance to reclaim the right if he manifests a willingness to conduct himself 
consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts 
and judicial proceedings. 
B. Standby Public Defenders 
Whether in a situation where a defendant is representing himself, or 
where he is represented by retained counsel, a war crimes tribunal must 
have standby counsel ready to step in when needed. 5° Such occasions would 
include situations where the defendant or his counsel engage in persistently 
disruptive or obstructionist behavior, or where they stage a walk-out or a 
boycott of the proceedings 
Just as a war crimes tribunal should appoint at least one alternate 
judge who observes the trial from its commencement in case one of the 
judges should need to be replaced for health or other reasons, so too should 
45 See Prosecutor v. Seslj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the 
Trial Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel,~ 21 (Oct. 20, 2006). 
46 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-07-19-T Decision on Defense Counsel 
Motion to Withdraw, ~ 24 (Nov. 2, 2000); see also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 
(1912) (holding that a trial could continue where the defendant refused to appear in the court-
room . . . to hold otherwise would enable the defendant to "paralyze the proceedings of 
courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce"). 
47 Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-4-14-T, Decision on the Application of 
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the 
Special Court,~ 14 (Jan. 17, 2005). 
48 Prosecutor v. Seslj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel,~ 21 (Oct. 20, 2006). 
49 Prosecutor v. Mi1osevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel,~ 17 (Nov. 1, 2004). 
50 The concept of standby counsel refers to an attorney who is appointed to assist a self-
represented defendant. Daniel Klein, Annotation, Right, under Federal Constitution, of ac-
cused to represent himself or herself in criminal proceeding--Supreme Court cases, 145 
L.Ed. 2d 1177 (2004). 
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standby public defenders be present from the beginning of the trial. Such 
counsel should be highly qualified, receive the same international training 
as prosecutors and judges, and be assisted by international experts. The very 
presence of standby public defenders can have a deterrent effect on miscon-
duct by a self-represented defendant or by retained defense counsel because 
they will recognize that their disruptive actions will not successfully derail 
the trial, which can proceed without pause with standby counsel. 
Ironically, the Iraqi High Tribunal did, in fact, appoint standby pub-
lic defenders, but failed to provide timely notice to the media of their ap-
pointment, to describe their credentials, or to explain their function. Conse-
quently, several print and broadcast media outlets erroneously reported that 
Saddam Hussein was not represented by any counsel during those periods in 
which his retained counsel were boycotting the proceedings. Similarly, hu-
man rights organizations, which were publicly critical of the skills and ex-
perience of the public defenders, failed to recognize that they were, in fact, 
being assisted by international experts obtained and paid by the Interna-
tional Bar Association.51 
C. Expulsion and Other Sanctions 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber indicated in the Milosevic case that the 
principle of proportionality must always be taken into account in crafting an 
appropriate response to disruption or delay.52 With this admonition in mind, 
a war crimes tribunal should deal with the six categories of defendant mis-
conduct identified above as follows: 
First, passive disrespect should generally be ignored unless it substantially 
interferes with the proceedings. The essential dignity and decorum of a 
courtroom does not turn on whether the defendant stands or addresses the 
judge as "Your Honor." 
Second, a judge should inquire as to why a defendant is refusing to coop-
erate with the fundamental ground rules of court proceedings. Often such 
behavior is in response to perceived unfair decisions by the bench.53 The 
defendant should be assured that his rights will be protected, and warned 
that he faces exclusion from the courtroom or other appropriate and pro-
portional actions. 
51 
See Eric Blindennan, Judging Human Rights Watch, 39 CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 
(2007). 
52 
See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, ~~ 17-18 
(Nov. I, 2004). 
53 
. In the case of the Saddam Hussein trial, this perception was in part caused by the 
Judge_s' ,ill-conceived decision to defer pronouncement of most pre-trial motions until after 
the trial s conclusion. 
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Third, a single obscenity or outburst should be met with a warning that 
continued disruptions of this kind will lead to sanctions, including expul-
sion from the courtroom. 
Fourth, repeated interruptions of a trial may be dealt with by expulsion af-
ter appropriate warnings have been given. Where the defendant is ex-
cluded from his trial the court should make reasonable efforts to enable 
him to keep apprised of the progress of the trial and to communicate with 
his attorney. 
Fifth, since a televised trial gives the defendant the opportunity to commu-
nicate directly with the population at large, the judge must be particularly 
vigilant not to permit the defendant to use the courtroom as a stage to in-
cite mass violence. 54 
Sixth, physical violence in the courtroom cannot be tolerated and a court 
may deal with it by immediate expulsion or use of physical restraints. 
Following the first incident of disruption, the judge should issue a 
warning, explicitly describing the sanction that will be imposed if the dis-
ruptive conduct continues. The warning should explain that the defendant's 
conduct is disruptive and will not be tolerated. It should also alert the de-
fendant that future occurrences will result in expulsion from the trial for as 
long as his disruptive posture is maintained and that the trial will continue in 
his absence. The warning should explain that in addition to exclusion, the 
judge may impose other sanctions on the defendant, such as relocating him 
to a smaller cell, decreasing the time he gets for recreation, or reducing his 
access to other prisoners and family. 
While the judicial process may well proceed more smoothly without 
the defendant in the courtroom, his absence may diminish the educative 
function of the trial. During Saddam Hussein's boycott of the Dujail triai, 
for example, print and broadcast media attention quickly dwindled, denying 
the public a chance to learn about some of the most important documents 
and testimony admitted into evidence. Thus, there are good reasons to avoid 
the sanction of expulsion if possible. Consequently, if disruptive conduct 
persists despite the initial warning, the judge should issue a firmer warning, 
recess to discuss the matter with the defendant and his lawyer, or briefly 
adjourn the proceedings to allow for a cooling-off period. Further disruption 
should result in temporary exclusion, followed by a calibrated response pro-
portionate to the degree and persistence of disruption. 
54 Most war crimes tribunals have employed a twenty-minute delay in the broadcast of the 
trial proceedings to enable them to edit out such dangerous outbursts, but the judge should 
firmly communicate that such statements will be met with the sanction of exclusion. In the 
Dujail trial, the judge reportedly told Saddam Hussein it was one thing to encourage support-
ers to kill Americans, but it was utterly unacceptable for him to encourage the killing of 
Iraqis. 
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D. Responding to Contumacious Counsel 
With respect to disorderly defense counsel, the judge should clearly 
set the ground rules of the trial from the beginning, warning that disruptive 
conduct will not be tolerated and describing the sanctions that will be im-
posed in response to such transgression. Although the demeanor and con-
duct of counsel that is deemed acceptable may vary somewhat from country 
to country, most of the world's legal professions follow the basic principle 
that a lawyer must be "respectful, comieous and above-board in his rela-
tions with a judge" before whom he appears.55 Especially in a major war 
crimes trial, deferential comiroom behavior is necessary to ensure that the 
judge's decisions are not perceived to be based on emotional reactions to 
insult. 
Following the lead of the Special Comi for Sierra Leone, all war 
crimes tribunals should adopt a Code ofProfessional Conduct, which spells 
out the rules of comiroom decorum applicable to both the prosecution and 
defense counsel. Consistent with such a code, after an approp1iate warning, 
persistent insults and disrespectful comments should be met with sanctions, 
including fines, jail time, suspension, and even disbarment. Because a judge 
has inherent power to remove a disruptive defendant from the comiroom, he 
also possesses the inherent power to deal with a disruptive lawyer in the 
same way and to temporarily or permanently replace him with standby 
counsel. 
It is important in this regard to stress that the obligations of a de-
fense counsel are not just to his client, but also to the court and to the larger 
interests of justice that the court is serving. Defense counsel are not merely 
agents of their client, permitted and perhaps even obliged to do for the ac-
cused everything he would do for himself were he trying his own case. As 
the American Bar Association has explained, "[i]t would be difficult to 
imagine anything which would more gravely demean the advocate or un-
dermine the integrity of our system of justice than the idea that a defense 
lawyer should be simply a conduit for his client's desires."56 If a client in-
sists on his attorney asking improper questions, making irrelevant speeches, 
insulting the bench, or staging walk-outs or boycotts, the lawyer must reject 
those instructions, for he cannot excuse his own professional misconduct on 
the ground that his client demanded it. 
Moreover, the defense counsel should seek to dissuade his client 
~om in1proper comiroom behavior, including explaining to him the sane-
hans that may be imposed by the judge and the probable prejudice to his 
case if he disrupts the proceedings. A defense counsel who encourages 
55 
E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-36 (1980). 
56 
(AB STAN?ARDS RELATING TOT~ P~OSECU'~'ION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 146 
A ProJect on Standards for Crumnal Justice, 1971). 
170 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 39:155 
courtroom misconduct may be punished under the rules that establish his 
own responsibility for maintaining courtroom decorum. If he advises a cli-
ent to act disruptively (or suggests methods for doing so), the court has au-
thority to discipline counsel. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FAIR TRIAL VERSUS INTEREST OF JUSTICE 
Revoking the right of self-representation, replacing retained counsel 
with standby public defenders, or expelling the defendant or defense lawyer 
from the courtroom may initiate a number of practical difficulties. After the 
revocation of Slobodan Milosevic's right of self-representation, for exam-
ple, the defendant refused to cooperate with the assigned counsel, and wit-
nesses for the defendant refused to appear in court or to answer questions 
until the defendant's control of his case was restored. 57 Similarly, Saddam 
Hussein not only refused to cooperate with the public defenders during the 
boycott of his retained counsel, but he attempted (without success) to pre-
vent the public defenders from delivering a closing argument on his be-
half.58 
Such a situation obviously impacts negatively on the defendant's 
fair trial rights, but the international tribunals have interpreted the duty to 
ensure that a trial is fair to include concerns that go beyond just those of the 
defendant. The narrow fair trial rights of the defendant must be considered 
in the context of broader interests of justice which require "that the trial 
proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or disrup-
tions."59 
57 See generally Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session (Nov. 10, 
2004) (submissions by the prosecution, referring to the accused being implicated in refusal of 
witnesses to testify). 
58 See Blinderman, supra note 51. 
59 Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for 
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defense,~ 21 (May 9, 2003). 
